One of the major challenges for electronic commerce is how to establish a relationship of trust between different parties. Establishing trust is nontrivial, because the traditional physical or social means of trust cannot apply directly in virtual settings. In many cases, the parties involved may not ever have interacted before. Reputation systems seek to address the development of trust by recording the reputations of different parties. However, most existing reputation systems are restricted to individual market web-sites. Further, relevant information about a party may come from several web-sites and from interaction that were not mediated by any web-site.
INTRODUCTION
It is important for participants (buyers, sellers, partners) to estimate each other's trustworthiness before initiating any commercial transactions. Not only do buyers need to trust sellers, but also sellers need to trust buyers. Let us consider a simple example. Before a buyer decides to provide his credit card information to a prospective seller, he must trust the seller sufficiently with regard to the quality of products the seller will send, the expected delivery time, and the seller's customer service. Likewise, the seller must trust the prospective buyer enough to realize that the buyer is seriously considering the purchase, will not attempt to cancel his payment, and will not try to cheat the seller in any way. Usually, a trust judgment of this sort cannot be made from information available from the seller's web-site. For example, the buyer may have to consult other buyers who have past experience with the seller. In other words, to estimate the trustworthiness of a given party, it is reasonable to try to find what reputation it has within some salient group.
Reputation systems are mechanisms that support such estimations. Current reputation systems are geared toward capturing information on sellers' past behavior as ratings given by buyers, e.g., [20] . In eBay, sellers receive feedback (+1, 0, −1) for their reliability in each auction. Their reputation is calculated as the sum of the ratings they received over the preceding six months. In Bizrate.com, each customer is asked to complete a survey evaluating the retailers after each purchase.
Explicit reputation systems are helpful in fostering trust among strangers. However, most existing reputation systems are completely centralized. Further, they require users to explicitly make and reveal their ratings of others. This would not be acceptable to many users. Further, such ratings would often be made strategically and may not reflect the trustworthiness of the rated parties. For example, Resnick et al. found that ratings on eBay are almost always positive [19] . Also they found there is a high correlation between ratings by buyers and sellers, suggesting that eBay users reciprocate and retaliate.
However, while current centralized approaches to reputation management suffer from the above limitations, the idea of reputation management is important and may often be the only viable source of estimations of trustworthiness. For this reason, we consider distributed reputation management, which involves aggregating ratings for a given party from others. No central authorities are assumed.
Briefly, this paper develops an evidential model of reputation management based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. In this approach, software agents assisting each participant in obtaining, evaluating, and combining the ratings. The agents cooperate by giving referrals to each other. An agent's value to another agent depends greatly upon the quality of the referrals it offers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our technical approach, giving the key definitions for local rating and propagation through referrals. Section 3 presents our experimental results. Section 4 summarizes some related work in reputation management. Section 5 describes some interesting conclusions and directions for future research.
DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
The proposed approach builds on our work on referral networks [25] . An agent-based referral network is a multiagent system whose member agents give referrals to one another (and are able to follow referrals received from other agents). To do so effectively presupposes certain representation and reasoning capabilities on the part of each agent. Each agent has a set of acquaintances, a subset of which are identified as its neighbors. The neighbors are the agents that the given agent would contact and the agents that it would point (refer) others to. An agent maintains a model of each acquaintance. This model includes the agent's abilities to act in a trustworthy manner and to refer to other trustworthy agents, respectively. The first ability we term expertise and the second ability we term sociability.
Each agent may modify its models of its acquaintances, potentially based on its direct interactions with the acquaintance, based on interactions with agents referred to by the acquaintance, and based on ratings of this acquaintances received from other agents. In practice, not all of these means are simultaneously useful. Importantly, in our approach, agents can adaptively choose their neighbors, which they do every so often from among their current acquaintances. The process of finding witnesses, where agent A tries to estimate the trustworthiness of agent E, and D is a witness to E.
An agent may estimate the trustworthiness of a given party based on its own past interactions or may consult other trusted agents who have directly interacted with the same party. These agents are termed witnesses. An agent can find the right witnesses by seeking and following referrals from its neighbors. Figure 1 shows the process where agent A finds a witness D through the referrals A → B → D.
Intuitively, the agents' decisions depend upon the wishes of its user. This presupposes that the agents will act through user interfaces that support user feedback. That is, after each transaction, an agent can obtain its user's ratings of the other parties involved. This is effectively the same approach as in current commercial systems. The agent records these ratings. When a user has had direct interactions with another party, the user's own ratings are used to determine how much to trust the given party. When a user has not had sufficient interactions, the user's agent looks for agents of other users who are trustworthy and have had suitable interactions. In this sense, ours is a social approach for reputation. Each agent autonomously decides whether to entertain requests from other agents and whether to reveal its true ratings.
Finding if a party is trustworthy reduces to combining the rating given to it locally (based on direct interactions, if any) with the ratings assigned to that party by others. However, some important challenges must be addressed first.
• Local ratings. How may an agent rate another party based on direct interactions with it? Our approach does so by capturing the ratings over the last several interactions, which are recorded in the given agent's history, and then converting the ratings into belief functions.
• Witnesses. How may the agent find the right witnesses? Our approach applies a process of referrals, each agent being queried potentially offering referrals to other agents. This can lead to a focused search that does not send irrelevant messages to several agents and in which agents can help one another.
• Testimonies. How may the agent systematically incorporate the testimonies of the witnesses? Our approach includes the necessary representations and reasoning through which testimonies issued by witnesses can be combined in a principled manner.
The referrals-based approach developed here addresses these challenges directly. In particular, as discussed in Section 4, our approach has an advantage over other approaches in terms of the second and third challenges above. However, before we can describe the above three elements of our approach, we must consider a representational framework over which they are layered. There are three main choices in this regard.
• Simply average all the ratings over a period of time. This approach is followed in the reputation systems in eBay and Amazon. Everyone's ratings are centrally aggregated into one score. Whoever intends to base a decision on the aggregate score has no support for deciding if the constituent ratings are trustworthy. Sometimes the ratings are augmented with text notes by each rater. This adds the problem that prospective raters must reveal their ratings to everyone.
• Apply the Bayesian approach to combine evidence [17] . However, the Bayesian approach cannot distinguish between lack of belief and disbelief. That is, a low belief score for a proposition implies, a large belief score for its negation. Lack of belief must be modeled through the artificial construct of equiprobable prior probability distributions.
• Apply the Dempster-Shafer calculus, which handles the notion of supporting and refuting explicitly [13] . There is no causal relationship between a proposition and its negation, so the lack of belief does not imply disbelief. Rather, lack of belief in any particular hypothesis implies belief in the set of all hypotheses, which is referred to as the state of uncertainty. This leads to the intuitive process of narrowing a hypothesis [10] , in which the initial uncertainty is replaced with belief or disbelief as evidence is accumulated.
Applied to the present setting, the proposition in question is whether a specified other party is trustworthy. Lack of belief would refer to the set {T, ¬T }, instead of {T } or {¬T }.
For the above reasons, this paper uses the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence as its underlying computational framework.
Dempster-Shafer Theory
Let us now introduce the key concepts of the Dempster-Shafer approach. Let T mean that the given agent considers a given party to be trustworthy. A frame of discernment is the set of propositions under consideration. 
Local Belief Ratings
When agent A i is evaluating the trustworthiness of agent V j , there are two components to the evidence. The first is an evaluation by A i of the services offered by V j . The second is testimonies from other agents in case A i has had no transactions with V j . Suppose A i has the latest H services from V j , S j = {s j1 , s j2 , . . . , s jH }. We use the distinct values of {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0} to denote the quality of service (QoS) s jk , where1 ≤ k ≤ H. Intuitively, these ratings are obtained from users.
Following Marsh [14] , we define for each agent an upper and a lower threshold for trust. For each agent A i , there are two thresholds Ω i and ω i , where 0 ≤ ω i ≤ Ω i ≤ 1. We use f (x k ) to denote the probability that a particular value x k of quality of services is obtained from V j , where x k ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0}. For example, given a specific value x k , and that there are three services with that quality in the latest h responses, then f (x k ) = 3/h.
Definition 2.
Given a series of responses from V j , S j = {s j1 , s j2 , . . . , s jH }, and the two thresholds Ω i and ω i of agent A i , we can obtain
Example distributions of ratings for different agents Figure 2 exhibits some distributions of ratings for different agents. Part (a) shows a distribution of ratings for high quality service providers, while Part (c) shows a distribution for low quality providers. Part (b) indicates that the quality of service could be random from a seller, although this usually does not happen in electronic commerce.
Combining Belief Functions
When an agent has not interacted often enough with a seller, it must seek the testimonies of other witnesses. Next we discuss how to combine such evidence.
A subsetÂ of a frame Θ is called a focal element of a belief function Bel over Θ if m(Â) > 0. Given two belief functions over the same frame of discernment but based on distinct bodies of evidence, Dempster's rule of combination enables us to compute a new belief function based on the combined evidence. For every subsetÂ of Θ, Dempster's rule defines m 1 ⊕ m 2 (Â) to be the sum of all products of the form m 1 (X)m 2 (Y ), where X and Y run over all subsets whose intersection isÂ. The commutativity of multiplication ensures that the rule yields the same value regardless of the order in which the functions are combined.
Definition 3. Let Bel 1 and Bel 2 be belief functions over Θ, with basic probability assignments m 1 and m 2 , and focal elementsÂ 1 , . . . ,Â k , andB 1 , . . . ,B l , respectively. Suppose
for all non-emptyÂ ⊂ Θ is a basic probability assignment [23] .
Bel, the belief function given by m, is called the orthogonal sum of Bel 1 and Bel 2 . It is written Bel = Bel 1 ⊕ Bel 2 . Let us now look at how beliefs obtained from two separate agents are combined. Suppose
Then m 12 is obtained as follows: Next suppose that one piece of the evidence confirms T , while the other disconfirms T . That is, we have the following situation:
Then m 12 is obtained as follows:
In this case, 0.72 of our belief is committed to the empty set. Since there are no possibilities in this set, the belief in our other sets must be normalized to 1. This yields:
Deciding the Reputation
It helps to distinguish between two kinds of beliefs: local belief and total belief. An agent's local belief about another agent is from direct interactions with it and can be propagated to others upon request. An agent's total belief about another agent combines the local belief (if any) with testimonies received from all witnesses reached (if any). Total belief can be used for deciding whether the agent being considered is trustworthy. To prevent non-well-founded cycles, we restrict agents from propagating their total beliefs. However, in principle, the necessary information underlying a total belief can be obtained by the requesting agent from the original witnesses. Agent A r models all of the information he receives about agent V g using belief functions, and then decides whether to trust V g . Figure 3 shows the whole process. Total belief is needed only if A r has not previously had an interaction with V g . Once A r has had sufficient direct interactions with V g , there is no reason for it to change its beliefs about V g based on comments from others. Under our approach, A r would have collected evidence from others regarding V g prior to its first interaction with V g and has no reason to seek it again after having interacted with V g directly.
To evaluate the trustworthiness of V g , A r will check if V g is one of its acquaintances, i.e., A r has some local beliefs about its trustworthiness. If so, A r will use its existing local belief to evaluate the trustworthiness of V g . Otherwise, A r will query its neighbors about V g . When an agent receives a query about V g 's trustworthiness, it will check if V g is one of its acquaintances. If yes, it will return the information about V g ; otherwise, it will return zero or more referrals to A r . A r , if it chooses, can then query some of the referred agents.
A referral r to agent A j returned from agent A i is written as A i , A j . A series of referrals makes a referral chain. Observing that shorter referral chains are more likely to be fruitful and accurate [11] and to limit the effort expended in pursuing referrals, we define depthLimit as the bound on the length of any referral chain. The value of depthLimit and strategies to control the referring process are interesting questions for referral networks [28] . The referral process terminates in success when at least one rating is received and in failure when the depthLimit is reached or when it arrives at an agent neither gives an answer rating nor a referral.
To simplify the notation, we refer to the initial contact A r , A i as a referral as well. For simplicity, a chain is written as A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A k , where A 0 is the querying agent and every agent A i for i < k gives a referral to agent A i+1 .
TrustNet
Now suppose A r wishes to evaluate the trustworthiness of V g . After a series of l referrals, a testimony about agent V g is returned from agent A j . Let the entire referral chain in this case be A r , . . . , A j , with length l. A TrustNet is a representation built from the referral chains produced from A r 's query. It is used to systematically incorporate the testimonies of the various witnesses regarding a particular party. T N (A r , V g , A, R) , where A is a finite set of agents {A 1 , . . . , A N }, and R is a set of referrals {r 1 , . . . , r n }.
Definition 4. A TrustNet T N is a directed graph
Given a series of referrals {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n }, the requester A r constructs a TrustNet T N by incorporating each referral r i = A i , A j into T N . A r adds r i to R if and only if A j ∈ A and depth(A i ) ≤ depthLimit. Figure 4 shows how the testimonies propagate through a TrustNet. Suppose agent A r wants to evaluate the trustworthiness of agent V g , and {w 1 , . . . , w L } are a group of witnesses towards agent V g . We now show how testimonies from witnesses can be incorporated into the rating of a given agent. Let τ Ai and π Ai be the belief functions corresponding to agent A i 's local and total beliefs, respectively.
Definition 5. Given a set of witnesses ∆ = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w L }, agent A r will update its total belief value of agent V g as follows
Next we consider the situation where A r needs to compute its total belief regarding V g .
• Case 1: A r has interacted with V g . A r will trust
where ρ is a threshold for trustworthiness and 0 < ρ < 1. If we look at the belief function 
This is the benefit of distributed reputation management in case that the rater and the rated agents have never interacted before. • Case 3: V g is totally new to the society. In this case,
and π A r ({T V g , ¬T V g }) = 1. V g must initially establish its reputation in other ways, e.g., by advertising or obtaining endorsements from established agents [15] .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experiments are based on an extension of a simulation testbed previously developed for information access [30] . The experiments involve between 100 and 500 agents. Some of the agents are identified as sellers and the rest as buyers. Each agent is modeled in terms of its interest (describing the services it is interested in purchasing) and its expertise (describing the services it is able to offer). Both interest and expertise are captures as terms vectors of dimension 5. The expertise vectors for each buyer are random, but for the sellers, each dimension of the expertise vectors is limited to 1.
Each agent keeps the latest 10 responses from another agent. The agents are limited in the number of neighbors they may have, here 4. The length of each referral chain is limited to 6. Moreover, we introduce a probability between 0 and 1 to model the cooperativeness of each agent A i , denoted as C A i . The trustworthiness of a seller is viewed as the expectation of cooperative behavior from that seller. Agent A i will generate an answer from its expertise vector upon a query with the probability C Ai even when there is a good match between the query and its expertise vector.
In each simulation cycle, we randomly designate an agent to be the requester. The queries are generated as vectors by perturbing the interest vector of the requesting agent. An agent may query some of its neighbors. When an agent receives a query, it may answer it based on its expertise vector, or may give a referral to some of its neighbors. The originating agent collects all possible referrals, and continues the process by following some of the suggested referrals. Each agent may keep track of certain acquaintances (a superset, usually a proper superset, of its neighbors). In our simulation, we allow 12 acquaintances. Periodically, each agent decides which of its acquaintances are dropped and which are promoted to neighbors.
Metrics
We now define some useful metrics in which to intuitively capture the results of our experiments.
Definition 6. Suppose {w 1 , . . . , w L } are exactly L agents whose neighbors include V i . Then β Vi , the cumulative belief regarding agent V i is computed as
and the reputation of agent V i is defined as
Bootstrapping
The neighborhood relation over the agents induces a graph wherein the agents are the vertices with edges to their neighbors. Our simulation must begin with a graph. Following Watts and Strogatz's study of small-world graphs [27] , we begin our simulation from a ring (but with directed edges). The specific ring with which we begin is a regular ring with 100 Number of the agents who know the seller in the bootstrapping stage (from a regular ring) nodes and 4 edges per node. Initially, each node's out-edges point to its nearest neighbors in the ring. Since there are no real users in these simulation, the quality of service (QoS) is evaluated based on how close the answer it to the interest vector of the requesting agent.
The cooperativeness for each agent is set to 1 if not specified. For any two agents A i and
Only one agent is identified as a seller, called V g . We use a fairly low value for the lower threshold ω i to facilitate modeling the cooperativeness of seller agents. For each agent A i , we have Ω i = 0.5 and ω i = 0.1. Whether a given neighbor will remain a neighbor depends on how close the neighbor's expertise is to the agent's interest. After every 100 rounds, we compute the reputation for the single seller agent using the metrics defined above. The computation is not counted in the simulation cycle.
In the first simulation we evaluate the convergence of our approach. Consider the following two settings for the cooperativeness of the seller: (1) 1 or good quality service and (2) 0.25 or bad quality service. Figure 5 shows the reputation of the two kinds of sellers. The reputation of seller with C V g = 1 climbs quickly to 1 and then stabilize at 1. The reputation for a seller with cooperativeness C V g = 0.25 is low. Figure 6 shows the number of agents who know the seller. More and more buyers have the good seller (with C Vg = 1) as a neighbor (about 46 out of 99 agents). Fewer and fewer agents have the bad seller as a neighbor. Several agents have it as a neighbor early on in the simulation, but eventually few if any agents do. In the figure, it is only one agent's neighbor after 10000 queries. This is the reason why, in Figure 5 , the reputation is negative for a while and finally approaches zero. The convergence to zero indicates that the other agents have forgotten about this agent. 
Reputation Buildup
Sometime, the reputation of a seller will not remain stable for long. They might be good in the very beginning, but later they may lower their quality of service. In the second simulation, we show that a very good seller V g who accumulates a high reputation during the first simulation cycle of 25, 000, behaves cooperatively with a cooperativeness factor 1 until it reaches a high reputation value, and then starts abusing its reputation by decreasing its responsiveness factor to 0.25. Thus its average reputation begins to drop, ultimately settling at a reputation of 0. Figure 7 illustrates this case. A reputation of 0 indicates that V g is no longer a neighbor of any agent. That is, it ends up isolated from the other agents. However, in order to distinguish the agent with zero reputation (new agent) from the agent with −1 reputation, we might introduce a blacklist to remember all V g with bad reputation. We defer this enhancement to future work.
Community Size
Usually there is a better chance to select a partner in a large (virtual) city of 300, 000 people than in a small town of 3, 000 people. Conversely, it is much easier to collect "bad" testimonies in a small town. We conjecture that the average reputation of an agent in a smaller group should change faster than that in a larger community.
Given two groups of agents, with the number of agents 20 and 100, respectively. Suppose sellers V g1 and V g2 are two cooperative agents in the beginning with cooperativeness factors of 1. After several simulation cycles, both V g1 and V g2 decrease their cooperativeness factor to 0.25. Thus, their average reputation starts dropping because of their non-cooperative behavior. Figure 8 shows that the reputation of agent V g 1 drops faster (measured by number of queries sent by each agent) since it is in a smaller community. Low quality sellers in different community sizes
Another interesting phenomenon is that the reputation of agent V g 1 oscillates around −0.5, a low reputation level, but agent V g 2 's reputation changes back to 0. In conjunction with the above-mentioned experiments, this indicates that a bad agent is more easily forgotten in a big community than in a small group.
RELATED WORK
Reputation management in electronic commerce has drawn much interest lately. Yenta [8] and Weaving a Web of Trust [12] are two well-known prototype approaches. Yenta clusters people with common interests according to referrals of users who know each other and verify the assertions they make about themselves, while Weaving a Web of Trust relies on the existence of a connected path between two users. These systems require preexisting social relationships among the users of their electronic community. It is not clear how to establish such relationships and how the ratings propagate through this community.
A social mechanism of reputation management was implemented in Kasbah [7, 31] . This mechanism requires that users give a rating for themselves and either have a central agency (direct ratings) or other trusted users (collaborative ratings). A central system keeps track of the users' explicit ratings of each other, and uses these ratings to compute a person's overall reputation or reputation with respect to a specific user in a directed graph. However, it is not clear how the agents collect the ratings in an open environment where the number of agents grows to very large.
Trusted Third Parties (TTP) [18] are often employed to facilitate trust in commercial transactions. Typical TTP services for electronic commerce include certification, timestamping, and notarization. TTPs act as a bridge between buyers and sellers in electronic marketplaces. However, they are most appropriate for closed marketplaces. In loosely federated, open systems a TTP may either not be available or have limited power to enforce good behavior.
One of the earliest works that tried to give a formal treatment of trust was that of Marsh [14] . Marsh's model attempted to integrate all the aspects of trust taken from sociology and psychology. Since Marsh's model has strong sociological foundations, the model is rather complex and cannot be easily used in today's electronic communities. Moreover the model only considers an agent's own experiences and doesn't involve any social mechanisms. Hence, a group of agents cannot collaborate to rate others.
Tan and Thoen [26] discuss the trust that is needed to engage in a transaction. In their model, a party engages in a transaction only if its level of trust exceeds its personal threshold. The threshold depends on the type of the transaction and the other parties involved in the transaction. The trust in a transaction includes the trust in the other party and the trust in the control mechanisms. Tan and Thoen use these design principles to make people trust electronic commerce. By contrast, we focus on the computational model of distributed reputation management for electronic commerce.
Another computational method is the Social Interaction Framework (SIF) [21] . In SIF, an agent evaluates the reputation of another agent based on direct observations as well through other witnesses. Moreover, Schillo et al. tested the performance of two groups of agents with different settings for honesty versus dishonesty for altruism versus egotism [22] . This work motivates some of our experiments for reputation management. However, SIF does not describe how to find such witnesses, whereas in the electronic communities, deals are brokered among people who may have never interacted before.
We previously developed an approach for social reputation management [29] , in which they used a scalar value to represent an agent's belief ratings about another and combine them with testimonies using combination schemes similar to the certainty factor model. The drawbacks of the certainty factor models, discussed in Section 2, led us to consider alternate approaches.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] proposed an approach in virtual communities. This work adapts Marsh's work. It too uses concepts such as situation or contexts and simplifies others such as trust, which is limited to have only four possible values. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes require each agent to keep complex data structures that represent a kind of global knowledge about the whole network. This is a serious limitation, because usually maintaining and updating these data structures can be laborious and time-consuming. Also it is not clear how the agents get the needed information and how well the model will scale when the number of agents grows.
Aberer and Despotovic [2] simplified our model and use that to manage trust in a peerto-peer network where no central database is available. Their model is based on binary trust, i.e., an agent is either trustworthy or not. When a dishonest transaction happens, the agents can forward their complaints to other agents. Aberer and Despotovic use a special data structure, namely P-Grid, to store the complaints in a peer-to-peer network. In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of another agent B, an agent A searches the leaf level of the P-Grid for complaints on agent B.
Breban and Vassileva [4] present a coalition-formation mechanism based on trust relationships. Their approach extends existing transaction-oriented coalitions, and might be an interesting direction for distributed reputation management for electronic commerce.
There has been much work on social abstractions for agents, e.g., [5, 9] . The initial work on this theme studied various of relationships among agents. More recent work on these themes has begun to look at the problems of deception and fraud [6] . However, our proposed approach goes beyond their approach in its representations of trust, propagation algorithms, and formal analysis.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the problem of distributed reputation management for electronic commerce. We directly consider how agents may place trust in each other and refine the ways in which an agent may convey its ratings of the trustworthiness of an agent to another agent. Explicit distributed reputation management can potentially help the agents detect selfish, antisocial, or unreliable sellers in electronic commerce and thus lead to more reliable relationships among buyers and sellers.
The iterated, multi-player prisoners' dilemma is intimately related to the evolution of trust [3] . On the one hand, if the players trust each other, they can both cooperate and avert a mutual defection where both suffer. On the other hand, such trust can only build up in a setting where the players must repeatedly interact with each other. Our observation is that a reputation mechanism sustains rational cooperation, because good players are rewarded by society whereas bad players are penalized. Both the rewards and penalties can be greater from a society than from an individual [16, 24] .
Our present approach does not fully protect against spurious ratings generated by malicious agents. It relies upon there being a large number of agents who offer honest ratings to override the effect of the ratings provided by the malicious agents. In future work, we plan to study the special problems of lying and rumors in extensions of the present evidential framework. We also plan to study evolutionary situations where groups of agents consider rating schemes for other agents. The purpose is not only to study alternative approaches for achieving more efficient communities, but also to test if our mechanism is robust against invasion and, hence, is more stable.
